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Abstract
The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the subway and bus
bombings in London, and the suicide bombings in Casablanca are only a
few of the examples in which in recent years, terrorists have opted to attack
multiple targets at once. Often, their strong determination to attack makes
it impossible to completely deter terrorists from attacking altogether, and
instead, counterterrorist units must consider how to defend targets effec-
tively to minimize damages. We attempt to model a version of this scenario
by presenting a two-target sequential game where two players try to attack
and defend the targets respectively. The probability of successfully destroy-
ing a target is a function of resource allocations from both players, who are
also subject to budget constraints. We attempt to find the defender’s strat-
egy that will minimize expected damages by first exploring the attacker’s
optimal strategy. We show that the attacker’s decision to attack only one
or both targets is dependent on the size of the attacker’s allowed budget
relative to other game parameters, and use that information to evaluate the
defender’s strategy. We also numerically determine the optimal defender
security investment, as well its sensitivity to other game parameters. We
conjecture that as the damage and expected reward at a target increases,
the defender’s allocation towards that target tends to increase, while an in-
crease in the punishment results in the opposite effect. Such conjectures
allow for the creation of a flexible defense policy in the more applicable
bigger picture.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On September 11, 2001, terrorists successfully destroyed the Twin Towers
of theWorld Trade Center in New York City, USA, using hijacked airplanes.
On May 16, 2003, several restaurants, a hotel, as well as a Jewish commu-
nity center were attacked by suicide bombers. Numerous subway trains as
well as a bus in London, England, were bombed as a result of coordinated
terrorist attacks on the morning of July 5, 2005. These are only several of
the examples that show, in recent years, that terrorists do continue to plan
attacks against multiple targets.
Such instances have resulted in the increase of studies on terrorism. Re-
search has ranged from understanding how to seek and destroy terrorist
networks to developing effective defensive measures [Woo (2003)]. For ex-
ample, the Department of Homeland Security has initiated a program to
prepare and respond to acts of terrorism by financially assisting urban ar-
eas that are perceived to be at risk. However, the Department of Homeland
Security has also been criticized for inadequately calculating such risk and
thus, disproportionately providing financial resources [Willis (2006)]. Ex-
amples such as this call for a more organized and systematic approach to
determining risk, as well as studies on deterring terrorism in general.
In conducting such research, it is important to develop formal defini-
tions and a strong understanding of risk as well as its other components.
Risk is defined to be as the product of threat, vulnerability, and conse-
quence, where the three are defined as the probability an attack occurs,
the probability an attack results in damage, and the expected damage re-
spectively [Willis (2006)]. We attempt to model a situation which evaluates
methods of minimizing risk by looking at all three aforementioned factors.
Since terrorists often simultaneously select multiple targets for attack,
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terrorist deterrence strategies must consider how defense measures at one
target will affect the terrorists’ decisions to attack the remaining targets.
Sometimes, their determination to attack is so strong that complete deter-
rence is impossible. In that case, the question becomes at which targets the
attack will occur as opposed to if the attacks will occur.
Our situation involves the terrorists choosing at least one of two tar-
gets for attack, implying that total deterrence is impossible. The defender
will invest a security allocation for protecting one or both targets. The at-
tacker will then respond to the defender’s decision by allocating resources
for attacking the targets. Both the defender and the attacker are subject to
budget constraints with sunk costs; in other words, both are required to
use a certain amount for defense and attack respectively. The probability
of a successful attack is dependent on both allocations, and there exist re-
ward and damage parameters in the event of successful and failed attacks
respectively; hence, these parameters incorporate the components of risk
defined by Willis (2006).
Prior literature has suggested that this type of game theoretic model is
more appropriate than a reliability theoretic one [Bier (2004)]. Game theo-
retic models have considered defenders and attackers as two players in a
game; scenarios have included multiple targets for attack, both in parallel
and in series, and both perfect and limited attacker-knowledge regarding
the targets [Abhichandani and Bier (2005)]. Martonosi and Walton (2006)
look at a sequential model where both the attacker and the defender pick
attack and defensive allocations for a single target case. Bier et al. (2006)
consider a sequential two-target model where only the defender has an al-
location; the attacker can attack only one target, and makes his decision
based on the defender’s allocation. Sandler (2005) examine a similar model
where side effects from a target being attacked are considered. Bier and
Zhuang (2006) look at a two-target case with both defender and attacker
allocations, and the attacker valuations of the targets are known to the at-
tacker. The aforementioned models incorporate the probability of a suc-
cessful attack based on the allocations as well. My model utilizes these
ideas in a sequential two-target scenario, where both the defender and the
attacker will choose allocations, and the attacker valuations are unknown to
the defender.
While the model presented in this thesis assumes sequential turns, a
similar one with simultaneous moves known as the Colonel Blotto game
also exists [Shubik and Weber (1981)]. The Colonel Blotto game consists of
two players and n battlefields, and each player allocates forces to the battle-
fields. Each player wishes to maximize the number of fields secured; many
3models consider the probability of capturing a field as a function of the
number of allocated forces. Other models incorporate a value function for
the number of battlefields secured, as well as simultaneous generalizations
of the game [Shubik and Weber (1978),Coughlin (1992)]. My work is a se-
quential version of the aforementionedmodels, with the two targets and the
investments being analogous to the battlefields and the forces respectively.
Our model attempts to find the security investment for the defender
that minimizes his total expected damage. To do this, we begin by deter-
mining the attacker’s strategy that maximizes his expected benefit, and use
that information to determine how the defender should act in order to force
the attacker into an optimal scenario for himself.
We first find that the attacker’s optimal allocation is dependent on the
relative magnitude of his allowed budget, and solve for the attacker’s strat-
egy in two cases: when his allowed budget is ”large”, andwhen it is ”small”.
We show the attacker will attack both targets in a symmetric parameter case
where the attacker’s budget is sufficiently large (Theorem 3.4). We use this
information to demonstrate that the defender can minimize expected dam-
ages by defending both targets equally (Theorem 4.1). We also determine
sufficient criteria for the attacker’s optimal allocation in an asymmetric pa-
rameter case. If the attacker budget is sufficiently small, we prove that the
attacker will attack only one target (Theorem 3.10). In addition, we look at
how the attacker’s strategy changes with alterations in the game parame-
ters (Section 3.3.1).
We then proceed to determine the security investment that minimizes
the defender’s expected damage numerically (Section 4.2). In doing so,
we also determine how that investment responds to changes in the game
parameters. Because one must often approximate ranges for the game pa-
rameters in real-world scenarios, such sensitivity analysis is important in
determining an applicable and flexible defense investment strategy. While
we have not yet rigorously proven results regarding the optimal defense
investment, our numerical simulations provide a strong starting point for
creating the aforementioned defense policy.

Chapter 2
The Model
2.1 Rules and parameters
In our model, there exist two players: an attacker who wishes to attack
two targets, and a defender who wishes to protect them. The defender
begins by spending c1 ≥ 0 and c2 ≥ 0 towards defending targets 1 and 2
respectively. Note that ci = 0 implies that the defender chooses to leave
target i undefended. The defender is subject to a budget constraint
c1 + c2 = cM > 0,
where cM is a constant known to both the defender and the attacker from
the start of the game. Note that this is a sunk cost: the defense allocations
towards targets 1 and 2 must always sum to cM. We define cM as the de-
fender budget. We will also refer to the defender allocation by
~c = (c1, c2) = (c1, cM − c1).
The attacker observes the security investment ~c. The attacker then re-
sponds by spending x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0 towards attacking targets 1 and 2
respectively. If the attacker chooses not to attack target i, then xi = 0. Anal-
ogous to the defender budget constraint is the attacker budget constraint
x1 + x2 = xM > 0,
where xM is also a constant known to both players from the start of the
game. Therefore, the attacker budget is also a sunk cost. We define xM as
the attacker budget, and refer to the attack allocation as
~x = (x1, x2) = (x1, xM − x1).
One observation to make is that if x1 increases, x2 must decrease since
x2 = xM − x1. Similarly, as c1 increases, c2 decreases.
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We will also refer to the term feasible value for (c1, c2) or (x1, x2) to
mean any pair of allocations c1, c2 ≥ 0 or x1, x2 ≥ 0 such that c1 + c2 = cM
or x1 + x2 = xM.
2.1.1 Probability of success
Once the attacker has attacked, each target i is, independently, successfully
destroyed or not. The probability of target i being successfully destroyed
depends on the defense and attack allocations towards target i; we call this
probability pi(xi, ci). In other words, the probability that target i is suc-
cessfully destroyed given that the attacker and defender allocate xi and ci
respectively is pi(xi, ci).
We now make assumptions about pi(xi, ci). Note that although p1 is a
function of x1, we can still differentiate p1 with respect to x2 since
x2 = xM − x1, for we shall do so later in the paper.
• p1(x, c) = p2(x, c) for all x and c. Both targets inherently have the
same probability of sucguaranteescess function. Without loss of gen-
erality, any property that holds for p1 with respect to x2 also holds for
p2 with respect to x1.
• pi is continuous and twice differentiable with respect to xi and ci
when 0 < xi < xM and 0 < ci < cM.
• pi(xi, 0) = 1 if xi > 0. Attacking an undefended target guarantees
success.
• pi(0, ci) = 0 for all possible values of ci. A target that is not attacked
cannot be destroyed.
• dp1dx1 > 0 and
dp1
dx2
< 0. Obviously, as the investment towards attacking
target 1 increases, the probability of successfully destroying target 1
increases. As the investment towards attacking target 2 increases, the
investment towards target 1 decreases, resulting in the opposite phe-
nomenon.
• dp1dc1 < 0 and
dp1
dc2
> 0. The opposite occurs when the defense invest-
ment towards target 1 increases (decreases).
• limci→∞ pi(xi, ci) = 0. When an infinite amount is invested into de-
fending a target, that target cannot be successfully attacked.
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• limxi→∞ pi(xi, ci) = 1. The opposite phenomenon occurs when an in-
finite amount is invested into attacking a target.
• d
2p1
dx21
< 0. p1 is concave downwith respect to x1. This follows the eco-
nomic law of diminishing returns when the investment into attacking
target 1 increases.
• d
2p1
dx22
< 0. p1 is concave down with respect to x2; this is because p1
decreases at an increasing rate as x1 decreases, or as x2 increases
• d
2p1
dx1dx2
> 0. This holds since d
2p1
dx21
< 0, and x2 = xM − x1.
Note that for all examples in this paper, we shall use the probability
function
pi(xi, ci) =
1− e−xi/ci
1+ e−xi/ci
.
This function is rather convenient for it also incorporates the ratio of the
attacker’s investment to the defender’s investment; as this ratio tends to
infinity, the probability of success tends to 1, while the opposite is true
when the ratio tends to 0.
2.1.2 Rewards and punishment
If target i is successfully destroyed, then the attacker receives a reward ai ≥
0, and the defender suffers damage di ≥ 0. If target i is attacked, but not
destroyed, the attacker suffers punishment fi ≥ 0, and the defender suffers
no damage as a result of target i being attacked. If target i is not attacked,
neither player suffers any damage from target i. We refer to ai, di, and fi as
the game parameters.
While di and fi are known to both players from the start of the game,
ai is known only to the attacker. Although the defender does not know the
value of ai, he does know the density g(ai) fromwhich the ai are drawn. As
in Bier et al. (2006), we assume that g is twice continuously differentiable,
and that the ai are independent. The continuity assumption allows for nu-
merous convenient mathematical operations, while the independence as-
sumption is consistent with that of the other game parameters. Indepen-
dence also allows for easier numerical simulation, which we explore later
in the paper.
Figure 2.1 shows a tree describing the rules and sequence of events in
the model.
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Figure 2.1: A tree describing the rules of the model.
For all examples in this paper, we shall assume that the ai are dis-
tributed exponentially with parameter λi; in other words, g(ai) = λie−aiλi .
Note that this assumption is only for the examples; the theorems in this
paper still hold regardless of the choice of g. Now, this density is rather
convenient because it takes in only nonnegative values of ai; it also incor-
porates the often real-world phenomenon of diminishing returns for utility.
In other words, the chances of receiving a larger reward decreases at an in-
creasing rate.
2.2 Attacker’s expected benefit
The attacker chooses the level at which to attack each target based on the
security imposed by the defender, with the goal of maximizing his expected
reward. First, let yi represent whether or not target i is attacked. Then
yi =
{
0 if xi = 0,
1 otherwise.
Note that it always follows that y1 + y2 ≥ 1, because x1 + x2 = xM, so at
least one target must be attacked.
Defender’s expected damage 9
Now, denote Ti(xi|ci) to be the expected benefit to the attacker if the at-
tacker allocates xi towards target i, given the defender allocates ci towards
protecting target i. Thus, we define
Ti(xi|ci) = yi[aipi(xi, ci)− fi(1− pi(xi, ci))]
= yi[(ai + fi)pi(xi, ci)− fi].
Note that the first term in the first line represents the expected rewardwhile
the second represents the expected punishment. Also note that because the
attacker is obligated to spend his entire budget, xM, the cost of his invest-
ment does not appear in his net benefit function.
The total benefit for the attacker is the sum of the Ti. We define the total
benefit as
B(~x|~c) = y1T1(x1|c1) + y2T2(x2|c2)
= y1T1(x1|c1) + y2T2(xM − x1|cM − c1).
Given that the defender allocates ~c = (c1, c2) = (c1, cM − c1) toward
protecting targets 1 and 2, there may exist values of
~x = (x1, x2) = (x1, xM − x1) that maximize the expected benefit for the
attacker. We can consider these as functions of ~c, and we refer to them as
~xopt(~c) = (xopt1(~c), xopt2(~c)) = (xopt1(~c), xM − xopt1(~c)). Hence,
B(~xopt(~c)|~c) ≥ B(~x|~c), ∀~x 6= ~xopt(~c).
From here on, we shall write ~xopt instead of ~xopt(~c) and xopt1 instead of
xopt1(~c) for brevity. As we show later in the paper, there are also scenarios
where ~xopt does not exist.
2.3 Defender’s expected damage
The defender chooses a security allocation~c to minimize the expected dam-
ages incurred in successful attacks. When the defender chooses a security
allocation ~c, the attacker responds by investing ~xopt(~c) (if it exists) into at-
tacking the targets. Note that~xopt depends on the values of ai, fi in addition
to~c. As a result, the expected damage to the defender is
D(~c) = d1p1(xopt1(~c), c1) + d2p2(xopt2(~c), c2)
= d1p1(xopt1(~c), c1) + d2p2(xM − xopt1(~c), cM − c1).
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Since the ai are unknown, however, the defender wishes to minimize
his expected damage with respect to a1 and a2:
E[D(~c)] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
D(~c)g1(a1)g2(a2)da1da2 (2.1)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[d1p1(xopt1, c1) + d2p2(xM − xopt1, cM − c1)]g1(a1)g2(a2)da1da2.
Our objective is to determine the defender allocation ~c that minimizes
the defender’s expected damage as indicated by (2.1).
Chapter 3
Attacker’s Optimal Strategy
In order to determine the security investment the defender should make
to minimize the expected damage, we first look at how the attacker would
invest in an attack, as a function of the security in place, to maximize his
expected reward. This information can then help the defender pick the
appropriate allocation to force the attacker into a scenario which results in
the least damage to the defender. We characterize the attacker’s optimal
strategy by solving for ~xopt in various scenarios.
First, we show that if a target having a nonzero value to the attacker
is undefended, the attacker should always attack it (Theorem 3.1). Next,
when the parameters are symmetric, when the attacker’s budget is rela-
tively large compared to the defender’s, the attacker should attack both
targets to maximize his expected benefits (Theorem 3.4). When the optimal
solution is to attack both targets, the attacker should invest such that chang-
ing the investment would result in the increase in the expected reward at
one target to equal the decrease at the other target (Theorem 3.5).
When the attacker’s budget is relatively small, then the attacker should
attack only the less heavily defended target when the parameters are sym-
metric (Theorem 3.7). In an asymmetric parameter case, the attacker also
attacks only one target; the difference is that it is unknown analytically at
which defender allocation he would switch targets (Theorem 3.10).
We also consider how the attacker’s optimal allocation changed with
respect to the game parameters. Under certain conditions, if the attack or
punishment parameter at a target increases, then the attacker should in-
crease the investment towards that target (Theorems 3.11 and 3.12), and
if symmetric game parameters change simultaneously, the attacker should
not change his strategy (Theorem 3.13).
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3.1 Undefended targets
We shall first look at the attacker’s behavior when a target is undefended.
We show that if the attacker values that target with a nonzero amount, then
he should attack it.
Lemma 3.1. If a1 > 0 and c1 = 0, then ~x = (0, xM) is not optimal.
Proof. If x1 = 0, then x2 = xM, and ~x = (0, xM). Likewise, since c1 = 0,
then~c = (0, cM). Therefore, the attacker’s expected benefit from attacking
only target 2 is
B((0, xM)|(0, cM)) = T2(xM|cM), because no benefit is received from target 1,
= (a2 + f2)p2(xM, cM)− f2, by definition.
By the continuity of p2, there exists e > 0 such that
(a2 + f2)(p2(xM, cM)− p2(xM − e, cM)) < a1.
Rearranging yields
(a2 + f2)p2(xM, cM) < a1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM). (3.1)
Now we show that for such e > 0, attacking only target 2 does not
maximize the expected reward. That is,
B((0, xM)|(0, cM)) = (a2 + f2)p2(xM, cM)
< a1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM)− f2 , by (3.1).
Since p1(e, 0) = 1, this is equal to
a1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM)− f2 = (a1 + f1)p1(e, 0)− f1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM)− f2
= T1(e|0) + T2(xM − e|cM)
= B((e, xM − e)|(0, cM)), by definition.
Thus, the expected reward is higher for the attack allocation
~x = (e, xM − e), and ~x = (0, xM) is not optimal.
Intuitively, if one target is undefended, then the attacker is guaranteed
to secure the reward at that target if he attacks, no matter how small the
attack allocation is. This implies that attacking that target results in a larger
payoff than leaving it unattacked.
Although the attacker can increase his expected benefit by investing e
into attacking the undefended target, no optimal value of e exists, as the
next theorem shows.
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Theorem 3.2. If~c = (0, cM), and a1 > 0, then there is no optimal value for ~x.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, ~x = (0, xM) is not optimal. Consider ~x = (e, xM − e)
for some e > 0. We show that there always exists some 0 < e∗ < e such
that investing ~x∗ = (e∗, xM − e∗) will result in a higher expected benefit
than investing ~x. The expected benefit from investing ~x is
B((e, xM − e)|(0, cM)) = T1(e|0) + T2(xM − e|cM)
= (a1 + f1)p1(e, 0)− f1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM)− f2
= a1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM)− f2.
For e∗ < e, however, since p2(xM − e, cM) < p2(xM − e∗, cM),
a1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e, cM)− f2 < a1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − e∗, cM)− f2
= T1(e∗|0) + T2(xM − e∗|cM)
= B((e∗, xM − e∗)|(0, cM)),
contradicting the optimality of x1 = e. Thus, for any value of e > 0 in-
vested into attacking target 1, a better value can be found.
An intuitive reason for this is that any positive attack allocation towards
an undefended target guarantees that the attacker will successfully destroy
the target. However, there is no minimal value for such a positive alloca-
tion; hence no optimal value for ~x exists.
3.2 Defended targets
Next, we show that when both targets are defended, the optimal attack
allocation depends on the magnitude of the attacker’s budget, xM, relative
to that of the defender’s budget, cM.
One question we will answer is whether the attacker will attack one
or both targets. If the attacker were to attack both targets, the expected
benefit from attacking both targets should be greater than that from solely
attacking one target. This idea will be used in determining whether the
attacker’s optimal investment is to attack one target, or both. The following
sections explain how the relative magnitude of the attacker’s budget will
affect whether he attacks one target or both.
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3.2.1 Large attacker budget—symmetric parameters
We begin by looking at symmetric cases (ai’s and fi’s are equal) where the
attacker has a relatively large budget. We must first, however, introduce a
new expression:
P(xM,~x,~c) = p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1)
where ~x and ~c are feasible. P represents the increase in the probability of
a successful attack when the attacker chooses to attack both targets at an
investment of (x1, xM − x1) rather than just target 1. For brevity, we will
refer to P as merely the increase in the probability of a successful attack. We will
use the relative magnitude of P to derive a sufficient condition for when the
attacker will attack both targets.
We first prove a lemma that shows that given a value e < 1, if the at-
tacker budget is large enough, then the attacker can choose a feasible al-
location such that the increase in the probability of success is greater than
e.
Lemma 3.3. Fix cM and let e < 1. There exists a threshold xM such that if
xM > xM, then for every security allocation ~c, there exist feasible values for ~x
such that P(xM,~x,~c) = p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1) > e.
Proof. First, observe that as xM → ∞, both x1 and x2 are unconstrained.
Since limxi→∞ pi(xi, ci) = 1, and we can pick infinitely large x1 and x2, it
follows that there exists x1 and x2 such that
lim
xM→∞
P = lim
xM→∞
[p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)]− 1
= 1+ 1− 1
> e.
(Note that P strictly increases with respect to xM as long as, without loss of
generality, x1 increases and x2 stays fixed; this guarantees that once P > e,
P does not oscillate around it).
Therefore, there exists xM < ∞ such that for all feasible ~c, there exist
feasible ~x = (x1, xM − x1) such that
P(xM,~x,~c) > e (3.2)
Now, for any xM > xM, let k = xM − xM. For any x1 < xM such that
(3.2) holds, let x1 = x1 + k < xM. We know show that for any attacker
budget xM greater than xM, there always exists feasible attacker allocations
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such that the increase in the probability of a successful attack, P, is greater
than e.
The concavity of p1 with respect to x1 shows that
p1(x1, c1)− p1(x1, c1) > p1(xM, c1)− p1(xM, c1).
Rearranging terms and adding p2(xM − x1, cM − c1), this is equivalent to
p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1)
> p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1).
Note that the right hand side is just P(xM,~x,~c) which is greater than e by
(3.2); thus,
p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1) > e. (3.3)
Since
p2(xM − x1, cM − c1) = p2(xM − k− x1, cM − c1)
= p2(xM − k− (x1 − k), cM − c1)
= p2(xM − x1, cM − c1),
then by (3.3),
p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1) > e
⇔ P(xM,~x,~c) > e.
Therefore, for all xM > xM, there exists feasible ~x where P(xM,~x,~c) > e for
all feasible~c.
Intuitively, if the attacker budget is large enough relative to the de-
fender budget, then regardless of what security allocation the defender
chooses, the attacker can invest such that the probability of a successful
attack at each target is almost as high as that had the attacker attacked only
one target. This allows for the increase in the probability of success to be
greater than any e < 1.
We now show that if the game parameters are symmetric, and the at-
tacker budget is sufficiently large (a precise definition provided below),
then the attacker will choose to attack both targets.
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Theorem 3.4. Let a1 = a2 = a > 0 and f1 = f2 = f > 0. If xM is sufficiently
large such that for any feasible value of~c, there exists feasible values for~x such that
P(xM,~x,~c) >
f
a+ f , then for all feasible values of~c, 0 < xopti < xM. We show that
if the attacker’s budget is large enough so that the increase in the probability of a
successful attack is larger than the aforementioned ratio, then the optimal solution
is to attack both targets.
Proof. First, note that Lemma 3.3 indicates the existence of the necessary
conditions. Now, assume to the contrary that there exists a security allo-
cation ~c such that ~xopt = (xM, 0). Then it follows that the expected benefit
from attacking only target 1 is greater than any expected benefit from at-
tacking both targets. Therefore, for all ~x such that 0 < x1 < xM, we have
B(~xopt|~c) ≥ B(~x|~c),
which implies
T1(xM|c1) ≥ T1(x1|c1) + T2(xM − x1|cM − c1),
and substituting yields
(a+ f )p1(xM, c1)− f ≥ (a+ f )[p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)]− 2 f .
Rearranging terms, we have
f
a+ f
≥ p1(x1, c1) + p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− p1(xM, c1),
which is a contradiction, because we’ve assumed the existence of ~x such
that the above inequality fails to hold. This implies xopt1 < xM for all feasi-
ble~c. By the symmetry of the problem, xopt2 < xM, implying xM > xopt1 >
0 for all feasible~c.
In other words, if xM is large enough so the attacker can choose an
investment such that the improvement in the probability of success out-
weighs the cost of failure as represented by fa+ f , then the attacker should
attack both targets no matter what the defender does. If the reward is small
relative to the punishment, or if the attacker’s budget is small relative to the
defender’s, the attacker has less incentive to attack both targets, since either
the net benefit from or the probability of successfully attacking both targets
is low; the attacker would be better off allocating everything towards at-
tacking one target. In Theorem 3.4, a decrease in the reward results in the
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increase of the cost of failure, fa+ f , implying that the requirements for a
sufficiently large attacker budget become more stringent; a larger attacker
budget would be necessary to ensure the attacker can optimally attack both
targets.
Figure 3.1 shows a plot of xopt1 versus c1, when xM is sufficiently small;
Matlab calculated xopt1 numerically for every value of c1 to generate the
plot. The figure shows that 0 < xopt1 < xM for all feasible values of c1.
Figure 3.1: Optimal allocation towards target 1 when xM is sufficiently
large. xM = 20, cM = 10, a = 6, f = 5.
Now that we have characterized sufficient criteria for the attacker to at-
tack both targets, we would like to determine the optimal attacker amount
to invest into each target. While we have not determined sufficient criteria
for when the attacker will attack both targets when the game parameters
are asymmetric, the following result will hold as long as it is known the
attacker will attack both targets; whether or not the game parameters are
symmetric is irrelevant.
We show that the optimal investment occurs where the increase in the
expected reward from one target equals the decrease in the expected re-
ward from the other target, or in other words, where there is no increase in
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the expected reward.
Theorem 3.5. If there exists a feasible ~x∗ such that dT1dx1
∣∣
x∗1
= − dT2dx1
∣∣
x∗1
, then ~x∗ is
optimal.
Proof. First recall that since
B(~x|~c) = T1(x1|~c) + T2(xM − x1|~c)
= (a1 + f1)p1 − f1 + (a2 + f2)p2 − f2,
B is concave down with respect to x1. Also recall that dT1dx1 > 0 and
dT2
dx1
< 0.
Now let there exist ~x∗ such that dT1dx1
∣∣
x∗1
= − dT2dx1
∣∣
x∗1
. If ~x∗ were not opti-
mal, then the attacker could either increase or decrease x1 to increase the
expected reward, B. If the attacker can increase x1 to obtain a higher ex-
pected reward, then
dB
dx1
∣∣
~x∗ > 0
⇒ dT
dx1
∣∣
x∗1
> −dT2
dx1
∣∣
x∗1
,
yielding a contradiction. By symmetry, the attacker would be unable to
decrease x1 to increase B. Since B is concave down with respect to x1, then
dB
dx1
∣∣
~x∗ = 0
⇔ dT1
dx1
∣∣
x∗1
= −dT2
dx1
∣∣
x∗1
implies that x∗1 = xopt1, and hence, ~x
∗ is optimal.
Intuitively, when an attacker can only decrease his expected reward by
increasing or decreasing his investment towards target 1, he is at the opti-
mal investment. Only if the increase in the reward at one target outweighs
the decrease at the other can he improve his reward. Recall also that this
theorem holds when the parameters are asymmetric; the net increase and
decrease being equal depends not on the parameters being symmetric, but
only on the overall expected reward from each target.
Defended targets 19
3.2.2 Relatively small attacker budget—symmetric parameters
We now show that when the attacker budget is small relative to the de-
fender budget, the attacker will attack only one target. We begin by prov-
ing a lemma that states for a given hwhere 0 < h < 1, if the attacker budget
constraint is sufficiently small, then the probability of successfully attack-
ing the more heavily defended target is less than h regardless of what the
attacker does.
Lemma 3.6. Fix cM, ~c, and 0 < h < 1. There exists a threshold xM > 0 such
that if xM < xM, then p2(x2, c2) < h for all feasible ~x. In other words, we show
that for any defender allocation, there exists a maximum attacker budget such that
this budget will force the probability of success at a target to always be less than
some constant h.
Proof. First,
lim
xM→0
p2(xM, c2) = 0
< h.
Hence, there exists a threshold xM > 0 where p2(xM, c2) < h. Therefore,
for any x2 ≤ xM ≤ xM,
p2(x2, c2) ≤ p2(xM, c2)
≤ p2(xM, c2)
< h,
completing the proof.
It makes sense that if the attacker budget is sufficiently small, then the
probability of successfully attacking a target is always smaller than h re-
gardless of what the attacker allocates, since the attacker is limited by his
small budget.
We proceed to examine the scenario where the game parameters are
symmetric and the defender defends one target more than the other. If the
attacker budget is sufficiently small (the precise definition will be stated
below), then the attacker will attack only the less heavily defended target.
Theorem 3.7. Let a1 = a2 = a > 0 and f1 = f2 = f > 0. Assume the defender
invests ~c where c2 > cM2 . If xM is sufficiently small such that p2(x2, c2) <
f
a+ f
for all feasible values of ~x, then ~xopt = (xM, 0).
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Proof. First, note that Lemma 3.6 ensures the existence of the necessary con-
ditions. For any feasible~x such that 0 < x1 < xM, and feasible~c for c1 < cM2 ,
we know that p(x1, c1) < p1(xM, c1). Also, p2(xM − x1, cM − c1) < fa+ f by
assumption. Hence,
f
a+ f
− p2(xM − x1, cM − c1) > p1(x1, c1)− p1(xM, c1),
since left and right sides are positive and negative respectively. Rearrang-
ing yields
(a+ f )p1(xM, c1)− f > (a+ f )p1(x1, c1)− f + (a+ f )p2(x2, c2)− f ,
and thus, by definition,
T1(xM|c1) > T1(x1|c1) + T2(xM − x1|cM − c1)
⇔ B((xM, 0)|~c) > B(~x|~c).
Therefore, the expected benefit to the attacker from attacking target 1 is
greater than any expected benefit from attacking both targets. In other
words, ~x = (xM, 0) is preferable to any ~x where 0 < x1 < xM. Now, it
also follows that
B((xM, 0)|~c) = T1(xM|c1)
= (a+ f )p1(xM, c1)− f
> (a+ f )p2(xM, cM − c1)− f , since c1 < cM2
= T2(xM|cM − c1)
= B((0, xM)|c1),
which implies that the expected benefit from attacking only target 1 is
greater than that from attacking only target 2 (~x = (xM, 0) is also prefer-
able to ~x = (0, xM)). Hence, ~xopt = (xM, 0).
By symmetry, it also follows that the attacker should attack only target
2 if target 1 is more heavily defended, and if p1(x1, c1) <
f
a+ f for all feasible
~x. Intuition states that if the attacker budget is small enough such that the
probability of successfully attacking the more heavily defended target is
always less than fa+ f , then the attacker should attack only one target. The
target to attack should be the less defended one because the probability of
successfully destroying that one is higher. As the reward increases, fa+ f
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decreases, implying a lower attacker budget is needed to ensure that the
optimal solution is to attack only one target.
Figure 3.2 contains a plot of xopt1 vs c1 when xM is sufficiently small. It
shows that the attacker should attack only the less heavily defended target.
Figure 3.2: Optimal allocation towards target 1 when xM is sufficiently
small. xM = 5, cM = 10, a = 6, f = 5.
Figure 3.2 raises the question of what the attacker should do when
~c =
( cM
2 ,
cM
2
)
, that is, when the defender has protected both targets evenly.
We proceed by showing that if the attacker budget is sufficiently small and
the defender evenly defends both targets, it would be suboptimal for the
attacker to attack both targets, and that his expected benefit would be max-
imized by attacking only one target.
Theorem 3.8. Let a1 = a2 = a > 0 and f1 = f2 = f > 0. If~c = ( cM2 ,
cM
2 ), and
xM is sufficiently small such that p2(x2, cM2 ) <
f
a+ f for all feasible ~x, then both
~x = (xM, 0) and ~x = (0, xM) are optimal.
Proof. We first show that attacking only target 1 is preferable to attacking
both targets. For all feasible ~x such that 0 < x1 < xM, we know that
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p1
(
x1, cM2
)
< p1
(
xM, cM2
)
. Also, since fa+ f > p2
(
xM − x1, cM2
)
:
f
a+ f
− p2
(
xM − x1, cM2
)
> p1
(
x1,
cM
2
)
− p1
(
xM,
cM
2
)
,
since the left and right hand sides are positive and negative respectively.
Rearranging and subtracting f from both sides, we see that this is equiva-
lent to
(a+ f )p1
(
xM,
cM
2
)
− f > (a+ f )p1
(
x1,
cM
2
)
− f
+ (a+ f )p2
(
xM − x1, cM2
)
− f
⇔ T1
(
xM
∣∣∣ cM
2
)
> T1
(
x1
∣∣∣ cM
2
)
+ T2
(
x2
∣∣∣ cM
2
)
⇔ B((xM, 0)|(~c)) > B(~x|~c).
This implies that the attacker prefers ~x = (xM, 0) to any ~x where
0 < x1 < xM because the former results in the greater expected benefit.
Now we show that attacking only target 2 results in the same expected
benefit as attacking only target 1. First,
B((xM, 0)|~c) = T1
(
xM
∣∣∣ cM
2
)
= (a+ f )p1
(
xM,
cM
2
)
.
Since p1(x, c) = p2(x, c) for all x, c, then
(a+ f )p1
(
xM,
cM
2
)
= (a+ f )p2
(
xM,
cM
2
)
= T2
(
xM
∣∣∣ cM
2
)
= B((0, xM)|~c).
Hence, the allocation ~x = (0, xM) is also optimal.
3.2.3 Relatively small attacker budget—asymmetric parameters
We now proceed with the case where the game parameters are asymmetric
and the attacker’s budget is relatively small.
We show that again, if the attacker’s budget is relatively small, then
the attacker will only attack one target. We begin by showing sufficient
criteria for the existence of a defender allocation cˆ such that when c1 < cˆ,
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the attacker prefers attacking only target 1 to attacking only target 2. The
opposite is true when c1 > cˆ. We then proceed by showing sufficient (but
not necessary) criteria where attacking target 1 is optimal when c1 < cˆ and
attacking target 2 is optimal when c1 > cˆ.
Theorem 3.9. Fix cM, and let xM be sufficiently small such that
pi(xM, cM) < min
(
a1+ f2
a2+ f2
, a2+ f1a1+ f1
)
Then there exists a feasible value cˆ such that
the following hold:
• B((xM, 0)|(cˆ, cM − cˆ)) = B((0, xM)|(cˆ, cM − cˆ))
• B((xM, 0)|(c1, cM − c1)) > B((0, xM)|(c1, cM − c1)) for all c1 < cˆ
• B((xM, 0)|(c1, cM − c1)) < B((0, xM)|(c1, cM − c1)) for all c1 > cˆ.
Proof. Let xM be sufficiently small such that the aforementioned conditions
hold. Let
R(c1) = (a1 + f1)p1(xM, c1)− f1 − (a2 + f2)p2(xM, cM − c1) + f2
= B((xM, 0)|(cˆ, cM − cˆ))− B((0, xM)|(cˆ, cM − cˆ)).
Note that R denotes the difference in expected reward from attacking only
target 1 versus attacking only target 2. Observe that by assumption,
p2(xM, cM) <
a1 + f2
a2 + f2
, and rearranging yields
0 < (a1 + f1)p1(xM, 0)− f1 − (a2 + f2)p2(xM, cM) + f2, so
0 < R(0).
Similarly,
p1(xM, cM) <
a2 + f1
a1 + f1
implies that
(a1 + f1)p1(xM, cM)− f1 − (a2 + f2)p2(xM, 0)− f2 < 0, and thus
R(cM) < 0.
In other words, when target 1 is undefended, the difference in expected
reward is positive; the opposite is true when target 2 is undefended. Now,
by the continuity of R, there exists 0 < cˆ < cM such that
R(cˆ) = 0, which implies
B((xM, 0)|(cˆ, cM − cˆ)) = B((0, xM)|(cˆ, cM − cˆ)).
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Hence, there exists cˆ where the expected reward from attacking only one
target is the same, regardless of the target.
Also, since T is decreasing in c1, that implies that for all c1 < cˆ,
R(c1) > 0, so
B((xM, 0)|(c1, cM − c1)) > B((0, xM)|(c1, cM − c1)),
and for all c1 > cˆ,
R(c1) < 0, thus
B((xM, 0)|(c1, cM − c1)) < B((0, xM)|(c1, cM − c1)).
Note that Theorem 3.9 provides sufficient criteria for when attacking
only target 1 is preferable to attacking only target 2. However, that does
not imply that attacking only target 1 is optimal. (The optimal solution
may involve attacking both targets). The sufficient criteria for attacking
only one target are provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.10. Fix cM. Let xM be sufficiently small such that the conditions of
Theorem 3.9 hold. Let cˆ be defined as in Theorem 3.9. If the following hold:
• (a1 + f1)[p1(x1, c1)− p1(xM, c1)] + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − x1, cM − c1) < f2
for all feasible x1 when c1 < cˆ,
• (a2+ f2)[p2(xM− x1, cM− c1)− p2(xM, cM− c1)]+ (a1+ f1)p1(x1, c1) <
f1 for all feasible x1 when c1 > cˆ,
then ~xopt = (xM, 0) if c1 < cˆ, and ~xopt = (0, xM) if c1 > cˆ.
Proof. Let the defender invest c1 < cˆ. Then it follows that for all possible
values of x1, by the first condition in the statement,
(a1 + f1)[p1(x1, c1)− p1(xM, c1)] + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − x1, cM − c1) < f2.
After rearranging terms, we have
(a1 + f1)p1(x1, c1)− f1 + (a2 + f2)p2(xM − x1, cM − c1)− f2 < (a1 + f1)p1(xM, c1)]− f1,
and substituting definitions,
T1(x1|c1) + T2(xM − x1|cM − c1) < T1(xM|c1)
⇔ B(~x|~c) < B((xM, 0)|~c).
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Hence, for c1 < cˆ, the expected benefit from attacking only target 1 is
greater than any expected benefit from attacking both targets. Now, by
Theorem 3.9, we know that B((0, xM)|~c) < B((xM, 0)|~c), implying
~xopt = (xM, 0) when the defender invests c1 < cˆ.
By symmetry, ~xopt = (0, xM) when the defender invests c1 > cˆ.
Note that the conditions of Theorem 3.9 guarantee that c1 < cˆ implies
attacking only target 1 is preferable to attacking only target 2, and the new
conditions introduced in Theorem 3.10 imply that attacking only target 1
is preferable to attacking both targets, which proves the optimality of only
attacking target 1. Therefore, if the attacker’s budget is sufficiently small by
both Theorems 3.9 and 3.10, then the attacker will attack only one target.
Figure 3.3: Optimal allocation towards target 1 when xM is sufficiently
small and parameters are asymmetric; cˆ is approximately 4.1.
Figure 3.3 shows a plot of the optimal attacker allocation versus the
defender’s investment towards target 1 when the attacker’s budget is suf-
ficiently small by the criteria of Theorem 3.10.
Also note that Theorem 3.7 does not fall out as a special case of Theorem
3.10, for Theorem 3.7 allows for a less stringent, yet sufficient, condition for
the attacker to attack only one target.
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3.3 Other characteristics of the attacker’s strategy
Wenow examine how the optimal attacker allocation depends on themodel
parameters. Although in this model, the defender cannot change themodel
parameters to his benefit, it is still valuable from a policy standpoint to un-
derstand how the attacker’s behavior depends on such parameters.
3.3.1 Optimal behavior with respect to parameters
We first show that if the reward for successfully attacking one target in-
creases, the attacker’s optimal allocation towards that target increases, given
certain conditions.
Theorem 3.11. Let 0 < xopt1 < xM, ai > 0, and ci 6= 0 for both i. As a1 increases
and a2 stays fixed, if there exists a new optimal attacker allocation towards target
1, x˜opt1, where dBdx1 is defined at x˜opt1, then x˜opt1 > xopt1.
Proof. By Theorem (3.5), we know that
dB
dx1
∣∣∣∣
~xopt
= 0
⇒ dT1
dx1
∣∣∣∣
~xopt
= −dT2
dx1
∣∣∣∣
~xopt
⇒ (a1 + f1) dp1dx1
∣∣∣∣
xopt1
= −(a2 + f2) dp2dx1
∣∣∣∣
xM−xopt1
. (3.4)
Let a1 increase. If x˜opt1 = xopt1, then the left hand side is greater than
the right hand side, yielding a contradiction. If 0 < x˜opt1 < xopt1, then
dp1
dx1
∣∣∣
x˜opt1
> dp1dx1
∣∣∣
xopt1
, while dp2dx1
∣∣∣
xM−xopt1
becomes less negative, implying again
that the left hand side is greater than the right hand side. Since (3.4) must
be defined at the new value of x˜opt1, then it follows that xopt1 < x˜opt1 (since
x˜opt1 6= 0).
Similarly, if a2 increases while a1 stays fixed, then xopt1 would decrease
and xopt2 would increase.
The results make intuitive sense; as the reward for one target increases,
the attacker will wish to invest more to increase the probability of securing
a higher reward. Also note if ci = 0, then by Theorem 3.2, there is no
optimal value of x1. If xopti = xM, then it is impossible for xopti to increase
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as ai increases. Hence, it is necessary for the proof that 0 < c1 < cM and
0 < xopt1 < xM.
We now show that under the same conditions as Theorem 3.11, the at-
tacker optimal investment towards a target also increases if the punishment
for a failed attack at that target increases.
Theorem 3.12. Let 0 < xopt1 < xM, fi > 0, and ci 6= 0 for both i. As f1 increases
and f2 stays fixed, if there exists a new optimal attacker allocation towards target
1, x˜opt1, where dBdx1 must be defined at x˜opt1, then x˜opt1 > xopt1.
Proof. The logic for this proof is exactly the same as that of Theorem 3.11.
Here, as the punishment for a failed attack on a target increases, the
attacker will invest more in that target to reduce the probability of failure.
However, note that Theorem 3.12 requires that dBdx1 be defined at the new
value of xopt1, x˜opt1, which precludes x˜opt1 from being 0. This does not nec-
essarily imply that x˜opt1 is not 0; in fact, numerical results have shown that
the attacker will not attack target 1 at all if the punishment becomes large
enough that attacking is not worth the risk of failure. However, we have
not yet been able to prove this, since dBdx1 is not defined at x1 = 0.
We now show that the attacker’s optimal allocation doesn’t changewhen
symmetric attack parameters change simultaneously, given certain condi-
tions.
Theorem 3.13. Let a1 = a2 = a and f1 = f2 = f , and fix ~c such that 0 <
xopt1 < xM. Let the values of a1 and a2 change to a1 = a2 = aˆ. If the new optimal
solution, ~˜xopt, is such that dBdx1
∣∣
~˜xopt
is defined, then ~xopt = ~˜xopt.
Proof. Let a1 = a2 = a and f1 = f2 = f . Then (3.4) evaluated at xopt1
becomes
dB
dx1
∣∣∣∣
~xopt
= (a+ f )
(
dp1
dx1
∣∣∣∣
xopt1
+
dp2
dx1
∣∣∣∣
xM−xopt1
)
= 0
⇒ dp1
dx1
∣∣∣∣
xopt1
= − dp2
dx1
∣∣∣∣
xM−xopt1
. (3.5)
For a1 = a2 = aˆ 6= a , (3.5) still holds. If xopt1 < x˜opt1 < xM, the left hand
side decreases, while the right hand side increases due to dp2dx1 becoming less
negative, invalidating the equality. If xopt1 > x˜opt1 > 0, then the reverse
would occur. Since dBdx1 is assumed to be defined at
~˜xopt, x˜opt1 can neither
equal 0 nor xM. Therefore, ~˜xopt = ~xopt.
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The attacker will not change his optimal strategy since the net expected
payoff at both targets is still the same, even though it has changed in value.
However, intuition also says that if the punishment rises significantly such
that the net expected payoff is negative, then it would be optimal to attack
only one target to minimize such losses. Numerical results do indicate that
xopt1 can be 0 or xM; however, we have not been able to prove this since dBdx1
is not defined at those points.
Chapter 4
Defender’s Optimal Strategy
Now that we have examined the attacker’s optimal strategy in different
scenarios, we proceed to determine the allocation that results in the least
damage to the the defender. Recall that since the reward parameters are
unknown to the defender, he wishes to minimize (2.1), his expected dam-
age with respect to the rewards:
E[D(~c)] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[d1p1(xopt1, c1) + d2p2(xM − xopt1, cM − c1)]g1(a1)g2(a2)da1da2.
We refer to the defender’s optimal allocation as the allocation that mini-
mizes this expected value.
Analytically determining the defender allocation that minimizes (2.1),
however, is rather difficult due to the uncertainty of the rewards. For sim-
plicity, we first look, in the following section, at a symmetric parameter case
when the reward parameters are known, and show that the defender min-
imizes his expected damage by defending both targets equally (Theorem
4.1).
Afterwards, we proceed by numerical simulation to approximate the al-
location that would minimize his expected damage, and make conjectures
regarding trends of the defender’s allocation with respect to parameters
when the rewards are unknown. One conjecture is that an increase in the
expected reward or damage at a target tends to increase the optimal de-
fense allocation towards that target (Conjectures 4.3 and 4.4). An increase
in the punishment at a target results in the opposite effect (Conjecture 4.2).
Finally, while we also attempt to examine trends regarding the volatility or
the increase in the attacker’s budget, it has been difficult to state relevant
conjectures with a high degree of confidence.
30 Defender’s Optimal Strategy
Because it is often difficult to get exact values for the game parameters
in real-world scenarios, it is important to be able to approximate such pa-
rameters as well as determine how a defense policy should change as those
parameters differ within a certain range. These numerical conjectures pro-
vide a starting point for how one should plan a flexible defense strategy
given the ability to determine a general range for relevant parameters.
4.1 Known reward parameters
We start with a symmetric parameter case when the attacker’s budget is
sufficiently small. We will assume, for simplification purposes, that the
defender knows the rewards a1, a2 the attacker will get at each target if it
is successfully attacked. As previously mentioned, in the later sections, we
shall relax this assumption.
Theorem 4.1. Let d1 = d2 = d, a1 = a2 = a, f1 = f2 = f , and assume
all parameters are known to the defender. If xM is sufficiently small such that
p2(x2, c2) <
f
a+ f for all feasible values of ~c such that c2 ≥ cM2 and all feasible
values of ~x, then~c =
( cM
2 ,
cM
2
)
is optimal.
Proof. For any c1 < cM2 , we know that ~xopt = (xM, 0) by Theorem 3.7.
Hence, for any c1 < cM2 , the expected damage to the defender is
D(~c) = dp1(xopt1, c1) + dp2(xM − xopt1, cM − c1)
= dp1(xM, c1),
since xopt1 = xM. Now, because c1 < cM2 ,
dp1(xM, c1) > dp1
(
xM,
cM
2
)
= D
(( cM
2
,
cM
2
))
.
This implies that ~c =
( cM
2 ,
cM
2
)
results in less damage to the defender than
any ~c where c1 < cM2 . A symmetric argument holds for c1 >
cM
2 , thus
proving the optimality of~c =
( cM
2 ,
cM
2
)
.
In other words, if all the parameters are symmetric, and the attacker
budget constraint is sufficiently small such that the aforementioned criteria
are satisfied, then the defender should evenly defend both targets. Figure
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4.1 shows a plot of the defender’s expected damage versus feasible values
for ~c when parameters are symmetric. The plot was generated by deter-
mining the attacker’s optimal allocation towards target 1 for every feasible
defender allocation towards target 1, and using those two allocations to
calculate the expected damage. We see that the defender minimizes his
expected damage by evenly defending both targets.
Figure 4.1: Expected damage to the defender when xM is sufficiently small.
xM = 5, cM = 10, d = 7, a = 6, f = 5. The minimum damage occurs when
the defender invests cM2 into defending each target.
4.2 Unknown reward parameters
Since it has been difficult to prove results regarding the defender’s optimal
strategy when the rewards are unknown to the defender, we have instead
made conjectures based on numerical simulation. Our numerical simula-
tion consists of the following process: For every possible value of c1,
1. Randomly generate a1 and a2 independently according to their distri-
bution, which was assumed to be exponential.
2. Determine ~xopt numerically. In other words, for the generated ai in
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step 1, determine the attacker allocation that maximizes his expected
benefit.
3. Determine the defender’s expected damage using that value of xopt1
and c1.
4. Repeat steps (1)–(3) 100 times.
5. Determine the defender’s average expected damage based on the 100
iterations.
We then create a plot of the defender’s expected damage versus c1. The
minimum point marks the allocation towards defending target 1 where the
defender approximately minimizes his expected damage. Note that we use
only 100 iterations due to the long run-time of the algorithm; our plots,
however, suggests that 100 iterations are sufficient to determine the general
shape of the graph as well as the region of the minimum point in most
cases.
We now propose several conjectures regarding the defender’s optimal
strategy.
Conjecture 4.2. As the punishment at one target increases, and if the expected
reward and attacker budget are not too small, then the defender’s optimal allocation
towards that target decreases.
Intuitively, as the punishment at a target increases, the attacker has less
incentive to attack that target, implying the defender could also decrease
his allocation towards that same target. However, if the expected reward
or attacker budget are relatively small, then the attacker may originally
allocate very little to that target. Thus, if the punishment increases, chances
are the attacker’s, as well as the defender’s strategy, changes very little.
Figure 4.2 shows how the defender’s optimal allocation towards target 1
decreases as the punishment at target 1 increases.
Conjecture 4.3. Let the damage incurred by the defender at one target be neither
too small nor large relative to the other parameters. As the damage increases, the
defender’s optimal allocation towards that target increases.
It makes sense that the defender will more strongly defend a target that
is more valuable. However, if the damage is too small at a target, then
a slight increase gives the defender little incentive to increase protection
to that target. If the damage is too large and he increases the allocation
towards that target, the expected damage from that target is still relatively
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Figure 4.2: The optimal allocation towards target 1 decreases as f1 in-
creases. xM = 10, cM = 20, d1 = 4, d2 = 6, E[a1] = 1, E[a2] = 8, f2 = 7.
The minimum point shifts from about c1 = 8.3 to c1 = 3.8.
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high, which again gives him little incentive to increase his allocation there.
Figure 4.3 shows how the conjecture holds as d1 increases from 4 to 40; one
can see that the minimum point shifts to the right. However, when d1 goes
from 40 to 60, since d1 is already relatively large, the defender’s strategy
does not differ by much.
Figure 4.3: The optimal allocation increases from about c1 = 10.3 to about
c1 = 18 as d1 increases from 4 to 40, but how it changes is unclear as d1
increases from 40 to 60. xM = 10, cM = 20, d2 = 6, E[a1] = 10, E[a2] =
8, f1 = 3, f2 = 7.
Conjecture 4.4. Let the damage and expected reward at one target be neither too
small nor too large relative to other parameters. As the expected reward increases,
the defender’s optimal allocation towards that target increases.
An increase in the expected reward results in an increased attacker allo-
cation towards that target, which implies the defender should do the same
to minimize his expected damages. However, if the damage is too small or
large, then the defender won’t necessarily change his strategy for the same
reasons. If the expected reward is too small, the attacker has little incentive
to change his strategy because his expected benefit changes little anyways.
If the expected reward is too large, the attacker will allocate most of his
resources to secure it, so if the expected reward becomes even larger, the
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attacker cannot increase his allocation towards that target by much; there-
fore, these two scenarios result in the defender responding the same way
as before. Figure 4.4 shows how the optimal defender allocation towards
target 1 increases when E[a1] increases from 1 to 50, but not from 50 to 100
as the expected reward is too large.
Figure 4.4: The optimal allocation increases from about c1 = 8.3 to about
c1 = 12.5 as E[a1] increases from 1 to 50, but how it changes is unclear as
E[a1] increases from 50 to 100. xM = 10, cM = 20, d1 = 4, d2 = 6, E[a2] =
8, f1 = 3, f2 = 7.
Other characteristics regarding the defender’s optimal strategy we ex-
plored include the volatility of the expected damage, where the volatility is
defined as the vertical spread in the graph of the defender’s expected dam-
age at similar defense allocations. In addition, we also explored how his
strategy changes as the attacker budget increases. Unfortunately, we were
unable to find enough general trends to make any confident conjectures
regarding these statements.
Figure 4.5 shows that the volatility to the left and the right of the de-
fender’s optimal allocation towards target 1 increases and decreases respec-
tively as the punishment at target 1 increases. Figure 4.6 is an example of
how difficult it is to observe general trends as the attacker budget grows;
the volatility is huge, and one cannot easily determine the defender’s opti-
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mal allocation.
Figure 4.5: A look at the volatility of the defender’s expected damage as f1
increases from 4 to 50. xM = 10, cM = 20, d1 = 4, d2 = 6, E[a1] = 10, E[a2] =
8, f2 = 7.
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Figure 4.6: How the defender’s expected damage changes as xM increases
from 10 to 40. cM = 20, d1 = 60, d2 = 6, E[a1] = 1, E[a2] = 8, f1 = 3, f2 = 7.

Chapter 5
Future Work
We ultimately wish to solve for the defender’s optimal strategy for all pos-
sible parameter values and relative magnitudes of the attacker budget con-
straint. The starting point for determining the defender’s allocation in each
case is to find the attacker’s optimal investment. We have determined the
attacker’s optimal investment in the symmetric case where the attacker’s
budget is relatively small, as well as the number of targets the attacker
should attack when his budget is relatively small or large. In addition,
we have found sufficient conditions for the attacker’s optimal investment
when he will attack both targets. In regards to the defender’s optimal strat-
egy, we found that in a sufficiently small attacker budget, known symmet-
ric parameter case, the defender should equally defend both targets. Fi-
nally, we have approximated the defender’s optimal allocation numerically
as well as observed general trends of how his strategy changes with respect
to certain game parameters.
Short-term future work includes observing more numerical trends with
the defender’s optimal strategy, especially in regards to the attacker bud-
get and the volatility of the expected damage. More long-term goals in-
clude proving results regarding such trends, as well as determining the
defender’s optimal strategy analytically.
Other interesting cases to explore include when the attacker’s budget
is neither small nor large enough to attack only one or both targets con-
sistently for all feasible defense allocations. Currently, we have plots, like
Figure 5.1, that indicate that the optimal strategy is to attack both targets
for ranges of the defender allocation, and to attack only one target for the
remaining ranges.
Other goals including determining criteria for when the attacker’s bud-
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Figure 5.1: Attacker’s optimal strategy when xM is neither sufficiently
small nor large, symmetric parameter case. xM = 15, cM = 10, d = 7,
a = 6, f = 5.
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get is sufficiently large such that he will always attack both targets in a non-
symmetric case, as well as a closed form solution for the attacker’s optimal
strategy when his budget is sufficiently small. Ultimately, we also hope to
extend this model to the case of several targets, or budget constraints that
are upper bounds on the defender’s and attacker’s allocations, not sunk
costs.

Chapter 6
Conclusions
Due to the strong determination of terrorists to attack, complete prevention
of the attacks is not always possible. In such scenarios, defenders must find
strategies to minimize total damages to all the targets being attacked, while
considering that defense investments at one target will affect a terrorist’s
decision to attack the other targets. We attempted to model this situation
with two targets, a defender, and an attacker. The defender, and then the
attacker, pick allocations for defense and attack respectively, each subject
to a sunk cost budget constraint. The probability of a successful attack is
dependent on both allocations, and there are reward, damage, and punish-
ment parameters in the event of a successful and failed attack respectively.
We first examined the attacker’s optimal strategy in response to various
defense allocations and used that information to determine the defender’s
optimal allocation.
We began by showing that an attacker should always attack an unde-
fended target if it has a nonzero reward. Next, we found that when the at-
tacker’s budget is sufficiently small, attacking only one target is preferable
to attacking both. If it is sufficiently large, then the attacker will choose to
attack both targets. We also determined sufficient criteria for the attacker’s
optimal strategy if he were to attack both targets. Based on these find-
ings, we then show that in a symmetric parameter case with a sufficiently
small attacker budget and known reward parameters (to the defender), the
defender can minimize his expected damages by equally defending both
targets.
We also consider how the attacker’s optimal strategy changes as the
game parameters change. If either the reward or punishment parameter for
a target increases, then the attacker should allocate more towards attacking
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that target, given certain restrictions. Finally, if changes in the rewards
in a symmetric parameter case result in new symmetric rewards, then the
attacker’s optimal strategy doesn’t change (again, with certain restrictions).
We proceeded by determining the defender’s optimal strategy numer-
ically, as well as making conjectures regarding general trends of how the
strategy changed with respect to the game parameters. We noticed that an
increase in the damage or expected reward at a target tends to increase the
defender’s optimal allocation at that target, while an increase in the pun-
ishment results in the opposite effect. Since one must usually approximate
ranges for the game parameters in real-world scenarios, such conjectures
provide a strong starting point for creating a flexible defense strategy to
account for such ranges.
These results, of course, provide stepping stones for future work. This
includes proving results regarding the defender’s optimal investment, as
well as observing more numerical trends. Other work includes examining
cases where the attacker budget is neither too large nor small and extending
the model to multiple targets or flexible budgets.
With the recent terrorist attacks on multiple targets in numerous parts
of the world, there has been demand for a systematic approach to studying
risk and terrorism. The model we presented accounts for the multiple com-
ponents of risk as well as incorporates elements from prior work done on
this subject. In addition to provingmany theorems regarding strategies, we
were able to numerically calculate trends and solutions that have a direct
application to real-world scenarios. These results as well as the ideas for fu-
ture work form the necessary building blocks for the progression towards
solving the open-ended problem of deterring terrorism.
Bibliography
Abhichandani, V. and Bier, V. M. (2005). Optimal allocation of resources for
defense and simple series and parallel systems from determined adver-
saries. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 87:313–323.
Arce M., D. G. and Sandler, T. (2005). Counterterrorism: A game-theoretic
analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2):183–200.
Bier, V. M. (2004). Should the model for security be game theory rather than
reliability theory? Communications of the Fourth International Conference
on Mathematical Methods in Reliability: Methodology and Practice, Santa Fe,
New Mexico.
Bier, V. M., Oliveros, S., and Samuelson, L. (2006). Choosing what to pro-
tect: Strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker. Journal
of Public Economic Theory.
Bier, V. M. and Zhuang, J. (2006). Balancing terrorism and natural disasters
- defense strategy with endogenous attacker effort. Operations Research.
Coughlin, P. J. (1992). Pure strategy equilibria in a class of system defense
games. International Journal of Game Theory, 20:195–210.
Martonosi, S. E. andWalton, D. (2006). Optimal defense allocations to deter
terrorists.
Roberson, B. (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory.
Sandler, T. (2005). Collective versus unilaterial responses to terrorism. Pub-
lic Choice, 124:75–93.
Sandler, T. and Lapan, H. E. (1988). The calculus of dissent: An analysis of
terrorists choice of targets. Synthese, 76:245–261.
46 Bibliography
Shogren, J. F. and Crocker, T. D. (1991). Cooperative and noncooperative
protection against transferable and filterable externalities. Environmental
and Resource Economics, 1.
Shubik, M. and Weber, R. J. (1978). Competitive valuation of cooperative
games. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 482.
Shubik, M. and Weber, R. J. (1981). System defense games: Colonel Blotto,
command and control. Naval Research Logistics Quaterly, 28.
Weber, R. J. (1978). Probabilistic values for games. Cowles Foundation Dis-
cussion Papers, 471.
Willis, H. H. (2006). Guiding resource allocations based on terrorism risk.
Working Paper.
Woo, G. (2003). Insuring against Al-Qaeda. National Bureau of Economic
Research Meeting.
